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Media essays

Media Censorship in the People’s Republic of China

By Lei Su

(2005)

Media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been tightly controlled since 1949, after the Communist Party overthrew Kuomindang’s (Nationalist) reign and seized the power. Since then, Chinese media has been tightly censored by the Communist Party. However, after the devastating Cultural Revolution, Chinese people began to raise their voices to demand more diversity and freedom in terms of the content and style of media. Consequently, there have been several noticeable changes in Chinese media—the world’s largest media market. This paper aims at having a general look at the history of China’s media censorship and providing basic information about China’s state-owned media organizations. It will also address the important changes of Chinese media in the past, the critiques of its current control, and the perspective of its future. This essay focuses mainly on China’s printing newspapers, television, and Internet industries.

Historical Backgrounds and Development (1950s-1980s)

The history of media control can be dated back to the founding of the PRC in 1949. Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) considers the media as an essential tool or “the throat and tongue of the government” for the social stability, Chinese media policy has “tightened and loosened with the country’s state of stability” (Yan 2000, 518). As Fu and Cullen (1996, 21) argued that although the Constitution of the PRC claims that freedom of expression and press are protected, the protection is little more than symbolic. As soon as the CCP came into power, it started to utilize the national press system to consolidate its power (Yan 2000, 501).

The first thing the party did was to confiscate press facilities and seized newspapers and periodicals owned by Kuomintang. Once the CCP took over major cities in China, the first thing they did was to shut down the Central DailyNews and other 43 Kuomintang papers (Chang 1989, 31). According to Fu and Cullen, there were 235 state-owned and private newspapers in China in 1949. But since then private ownership of newspapers was dramatically reduced by 1953 and eventually extinguished in 1959 (1996, 25). In order to shape all newspapers to promote the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist doctrines (Lent 1981, 137; Lin 1994, 78), a registration law was enacted to force all newspapers to make their “political creed” clear, qualifications of the personnel, capital, income source, and previous copies (Chang 1989, 31). This law ensured all the operating papers have to serve the CCP’s interests. From then on, one of the major functions of newspaper “was to disseminate information about high level Party decisions” (Chang 1989, 32).

In the mean time, another type of newspapers was generated. Yan called them “target press” that “official or semi-official organizations published for specialized readers of various occupational backgrounds or socio-economic interests” (2000, 501, 509). Chang provided a more detailed list:

Gongren Ribao (Workers’ Daily) belongs to the Trade Union Federation organ

Wen Hui Bao (Wen Hui Daily) belongs to the teachers’ organ

Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (Chinese Youth Newspapers) belongs to the organ of the Chinese Socialist Youth League (and later the Chinese Communist Youth League)

Guangming Ribao (Enlightenment Daily) belongs to a cultural and educational journal that originally served as the organ of the non-Communist parties (Chang 1989, 32).

Generally, during the periods of 1950s to 1970s, all the media (mainly newspapers) in China were the official organ and the mouthpiece of the CCP (Yan 2000, 510; Chang 1989, 56-57). In other words, the media was totally “subject to the interests and goals of society and the opinion formation process as developed by the party” (Lent 1981, 138). In 1985, the former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang said in a speech:

All the journalism units are under the unified leadership of the CCP Central Committee, and all of them work in accordance with the line, principles, and policies of the party, and differences do not and should not affect the fundamental nature of their papers as the party’s mouthpiece. The main pronouncements of the party’s journalism organs and their major reports on domestic work and foreign relations should represent the party and the government not just the editor or the reporter (in Womack 2000, 175-176).

In order to control the press, the CCP forced them to fall into four categories: organizational, personnel, editorial and operational (Houn 1959, 436). Through the organizational control, the CCP created a structural setup system, such as when, where, and how many newspapers should be established, and who is eligible to found what kind of newspapers. The control over personnel ensured that the persons who are operating newspapers are loyal to the Party. Editorial control is essential for the party to supervise the press, which always makes strict editorial guidance and such guidance is “understood and scrupulously followed by newspapers on all levels”. In the last, but the most substantial, process of control, the CCP manipulates the publication, circulation, and financial administration of every single media organization in China. (Houn 1959, 436; 439; 441; 443). With these four procedures, there is almost impossible for any newspaper to publish articles that the Party does not want to see.

The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978 marked a significant turning point both for the country and her media industry. In that year, the national policy was shifted from the class struggle to economic development and reform. China formally opened her door to the outside world. The new policy also opened the door for the press freedom and flexibility in certain extent. The media industry had been experiencing a period of democratic development during the period between 1978 and 1989 (Yan 2000, 518; Lin 1994, 77). At that time, news media started to provide fresh information and promote independent thinking among their readers but not simply a propaganda machine for the government (Lin 1994, 77).

One noticeable change of the press is that there were considerable new publications were available for common people. Lin narrated his experience that:

In the first half of the 1980s I often browsed in the downtown main street, where dozens of stands were set up to sell all kinds of periodicals, magazines, evening newspapers and books. This was indeed a great contrast to the situation during the Cultural Revolution. In the early 1970s, when I was in my teenage years, I could hardly find any books to read except a few government–sanctioned publications (Lin 1994, 83-84).

Moreover, most of the new publications applied new topics, contents, styles, languages and symbols (Lin 1994). Chey suggested that at that time, China’s media was becoming more reliable. The media began to have more openness and honesty in admitting faults, especially about China’s economy and society, which was never ever possible before (Chey 1979, 108). Under Deng Xiaoping’s rule, it was even allowed to report the economic inefficiencies and political corruption in order to supervise and enhance economic reforms (Yan 2000, 505).

There were other significant changes over press caused by the requirement of economic reform. In order to achieve financial self-reliance, most of newspapers focused on making profits by putting advertisements on the paper. Yan asserted that this increased trends had influenced on press operation. First, due to the proliferation of business information, the party placed less emphasis on political issues. Second, the party publications had reduced and mass-appeal press, by contrast, had raised (Yan 2000, 508). The second appealing change led the emergence of weekend editions and tabloids. The principles of party journalism had been “disregarded or subverted” (Zhao 1998, 139).

Another important media form—television programs has also boomed since early 1980s (Fu and Cullen 1996, 74; Harrison 2002, 167). By the time of 1985, all provinces and major cities were covered by their own broadcasting system, which co-founded with China Central Television Station (Redl and Simons 2002, 18). One commentator praised the prevalence of television among Chinese people was the foremost step forward in respect the cultural and political development since the Cultural Revolution (Fu and Cullen 1996, 70). Not only the quantity but also the quality of television programs had dramatically improved. In 1980, CCTV reached an agreement with several overseas news providers to receive international news to improve its own news programs quality (Yan 2000, 514). In accordance with Wang and Chang (1996, 200-201), the percentage of imported television programs increased significantly from 9.5% in 1980 to 29.7% in 1990, and most of them were popular shows even in Western countries.

In 1983, a main policy change was generated that was local government had authorized to set up and operate television stations at city and county level. Before 1983, the nation’s television broadcasting was all provided by the central government (Yu 1994, 217; 222). The new policy also introduced a new four geographical levels system that included central, provincial, city and county governments. Each level of government was allowed to set up its own television station, but it had to be integrated into the central TV network (Fu and Cullen 1996, 76). In the following year, the Television and Radio Broadcasting Provisional Regulation (hereinafter “Provisional Regulation”) was enacted to regulate city and county television station (Fu and Cullen 1996, 76).

The 1983 Provisional Regulation boosted the progressive change of developing the cable television system. Although China owned its cable television in the 1970s, it developed very slowly in the 1970s. In 1975, only 1.9% Chinese population had access to television, and much fewer people were able to reach the cable television system (Hong in Harrison 2002, 168). Harrison (2002, 169) also claimed that the 1983 Provisional Regulation was “initial impetus” for cable television service. By 1990, there were total 13 million household cable subscribers (Qin in Harrison 2002, 170).

However, the government’s action of releasing the media control does not necessarily mean that the press could enjoy completely freedom. During the same period of time, the media was still suffering under firm supervision because of those regulations. Polumbaum (in Lin 1990, 49) noted that independent newspapers were still not allowed in China. Lin kept arguing that there were still publications been banned because they criticized some social problems or raised questions about the Cultural Revolution and other mistakes in a way that could not be accepted by the CCP (1996, 85).

Because of the specialty of Communist regime, the party is the only owner of television broadcasting. Hong (in Yan 2000, 513) introduced that all the television stations were under the dual supervision of Central Propaganda Department (CPD), which was directly responsible for the Party’s Central Committee, and the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT). The CPD was in charge of “setting media policies, determining programming content and themes and issuing operational directives” (Hong in Yan 2000, 513). The MRFT had the responsibilities that “formulate broadcasting regulations and policies, supervise their implementation, examine and approve the establishment of new television and radio stations, regulate China’s film, audio and video industries and manage cable television and satellite television programming” (Fu and Cullen 1996, 74). In local level, each province, city, and county has its own Party propaganda office, which carried out the CPD and MRFT’s orders.

The government had paid special attention to the control of content of television programs, especially news report. Due to the immediacy and effectiveness of television broadcasting, the party noticed the criticality of its influence. Therefore, the news censorship system is especially strict in this aspect. According to Fu and Cullen (1996, 76), when reporting the activities of political leaders, the senior level of CPD and MRFT would set many guidelines to limit the reporting, such as the size of the people, angles of shooting, time, etc.

The freedom of press in PRC suffered a huge setback after failure of the pro-democracy movement in June 1989 (Yan 2000, 502). Some newspapers, such as World Economic Herald,were shut down for the politically “false” report during the crisis. For example, in the early 1990s, the CPD “strictly controlled and greatly suppressed” all foreign television programs and movies (Ai in Chan 1994, 81). The MRFT cut nearly half number of time on CCTV that used to broadcast imported programs (Chan 1994, 81). Fortunately, this oppressive period did not last long (Yan 2000, 502).

Current Situation and Criticism (1990s-Present)

Along with Deng Xiaoping’s inspection tour of South China in early 1992, the press encountered another period of booming (Yan 2000, 502). In the past decade, China’s media has undergone a course of commercialization. In 2003, the government decided not to provide financial support for all the media (Hwang 2004, 1). So the media have to attract more audience by producing high quality programs. Meanwhile, there is less emphasis on the party’s political and ideological content. The government itself also noted that the media need more freedom in order to satisfy the taste of Chinese readers and follow the developing pace to the trend of globalization.

Although political propaganda still remains a crucial purpose for the state monopolized media industry, it is no longer the predominant objective (Chan 2002, 47). As Chan argued that “the government has redefined the primary role of media as agenda-setting rather than propaganda”, which averted the attention to educate people how to think and reason (2002, 47). In 1996, President Jiang Zemin addressed in a conference that the media’s task of agenda-setting was the primary goal in the development of China’s media industry. Furthermore, agenda-setting allows multiple voices to be expressed. Chan (2002, 47) summed up three identified tasks about agenda-setting. First of all, role models of propaganda should be remained. Second, to ensure media correctly guide the public. The last one is public supervision to the government should be strengthened. Jiao Dian Fang Tan (Focus), a famous Chinese social analysis and report program, is a typical example because of its justice and fairness with respect to the report on the political issues and other affairs closely related and affected people’s daily life. The recent statistics show that the program attracts more than 300 million audience everyday (Chan 2002, 35).

In March 1998, one major policy change occurred in the structure of China’s official media control system. Authorized by the Ninth People’s Congress, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT), the Ministry of the Electronics Industry (MEI) and parts of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television merged into the Ministry of Information Industry (MRFT). This new ministry is responsible for managing Chinese information in the twenty first century, and coordinating the CCP on building and managing the electronic media. In the meantime, the other part of MRFT was relocated and downgraded into the General State of Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), which continues to perform as the top government organ to practice media censorship and manage China’s broadcasting infrastructure (Redl and Simons 2002, 18). 

Benefiting from the development of new technologies, China’s media have rapidly flourished during the past ten years. There are two noticeable media forms that greatly enrich China’s media market and result in many censor difficulties for the government: satellite television and Internet.

The development of satellite television has experienced the similar process with cable television. Its origin started in the 1980s, but developed from the 1990s. In the early 1990s, due to the economic improvement, Chinese people had the capability to afford the satellite television system. By 1998, there were approximately 170 transponders available to media organizations. In 1996, only ten provincial television stations put their programs over satellite, and the number had jumped to thirty one by the end of 2000 (Harrison 2002, 171-173). The CCP government has realized that satellite television technology makes China’s media more influential and diverse. Moreover, the Party considers the satellite television a potent expression of the ideologies of their own (Harrison 2002, 171; Fu and Cullen 1996). Then the government somehow are stuck in a dilemma between to advance the technology and to control the reception of programs, foreign programs in particular (Fu and Cullen 1996, 88-89).

The CCP government is regulating the satellite reception mainly through issuing the license, promulgating the regulations, policing the equipment use, and controlling equipment availability (Fu and Cullen 1996, 92). In 1990, the Regulation on the Administration of the Reception of Television Programs Transmitted via Foreign Satellite by Ground Satellite Receiving Facilities Provisions was enacted. This regulation was replaced in 1993 by the Administration of Terrestrial Receiving Equipment for Satellite Television Broadcasts Provisions and the Administration of Terrestrial Receiving for Satellite Television Broadcasts Provisions Implementing Rules (Fu and Cullen 1996, 89).

The government strictly controls the organizations and individuals who can have the access to foreign satellite programs and also limits the equipment used for the reception. Under such restrictions, the access is only permitted to hotel rated three stars above, residences for foreigners and certain organizations. In order to emphasize the regulations, the government has banned private ownership of satellite dishes and also has required that foreign television signals encrypted with decoders must incorporated into cable set-top box, which were supplied under the limitations and regulations (Harrison 2002, 173). The SARFT and public and national security authorities together are charged with censoring the reception of satellite programs. The SARFT authority is also responsible for approving applications for receiving satellite signals and for supervising the production, sale and use of equipment. The national security part is responsible for checking the technological capacity of reception equipment and the public security part is responsible for investigating and punishing illegal activities (Fu and Cullen 1996, 89). There are also strict controls laid on the production and sale of satellite dish and any relevant equipment. The equipment can only be produced and purchased at authorized means (Fu and Cullen 1996, 91).

Fu and Cellen listed the application procedures for wishing receiving both domestic and overseas programs:

Domestic

?Apply to a Broadcast Authority at or above country level, that will send the   application to the Broadcast Authority at the prefecture or city level for examination and approval

? the Broadcast Authority will then issue a certificate, which can be used by the applicant to purchase reception equipment

?after installing the equipment, the approving Broadcast Authority will check the reception equipment and the installation. It will then issue a Permit for Receiving Domestic Television Programs via Satellite and report to the superior Broadcast Authority and the national security authorities at provincial level for the record

Overseas

? Apply to a Broadcast Authority at or above country level, that will send the application to the Broadcast Authority and national security authority at prefecture or city level for review.

? the application will then be forwarded to the Broadcast Authority and the national security authority at provincial level for approval

? a certificate will be issued by the approving authorities, which can be used by the applicant to purchase reception equipment

? after installing the equipment, the approving Broadcast Authority will check the reception equipment and the installation. The provincial Broadcast Authority will then issue a Permit for Receiving Overseas Programs via Satellite, and report to the SARFT and Ministry of National Security for the record (Fu and Cullen 1996, 89-90).

It is estimated that in China, 95 million internet users and the numbers doubles every six months (China 2004). Consequently, Internet media would be the most fashionable format received and accepted by the growing Internet users. As Harrison argued that the Chinese government believes the Internet has provided both promising and threat. On one hand, the Internet has created an excellent opportunity to enrich media and technologized China. On the other hand, the Internet also provides with an uncensored space for a large quantity of information, which most of them the Party does not want people to see (Harrison 2002, 177).

In March 1994, the CCP government announced that all Internet services providers must be registered. In February 1996, Administration of Accessing International Linkups of Computer Information Networks Tentative Provisions was conducted. It regulates that Internet users have such obligations that to “observe all law regulating state secrets, national security and information harmful to social order and morality (Fu and Cullen 1996, 93). On 14 February, the introduced a new regulation that Internet Services Providers must record their customers information such as IP address, postal address and telephone number when involved in so-called “strategic and sensitive fields” such as news websites and forums (China 2004). As a result, till now, it is approximately 21 cyber-dissidents are in prison, 16 are serving life prison (China 2004). Recently, the most effective way for the government to censor the Internet news are blocking websites and shutting down on-line forums. Fox instance, Chinese Internet users can not have the access to major foreign median webpage, such as CNN.com and BBC.co.uk. In recent month, the government started to censor and shut down Chinese universities’ discussion forums and web blogers.

Conclusion

China’s media has changed and developed dramatically. The censorship of media by the CCP government is heading to a less interfered direction. However, even till today China remains the one of most restricted media control countries in the world. According to the annual report from Reporters without Borders, and International Press Institute, Chinese government is still tightly maintaining the control over media to serve the Party’s interest. Nevertheless, it is believed that China’s media will be finally freed in the further due to China’s expanding global connection and constant politico-social reform. It can be proved by the announcement made by a high-tanking official in Beijing when the city was trying to bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Wang Wei, former Secretary General of Beijing Olympic Bid Committee said: “The world media will enjoy full freedom to report on all aspects of China, if the Olympic Games are held in Beijing” (China 2004).

Reference List

Chan, J. M. 1994. Media Internationalization in China: Process and Tensions. Journal of Communications 44 (Summer): 70-88.

Chan, A. 2002. From Propaganda to Hegemony: Jiaodian Fangtan and China’s Media Policy. Journal of Contemporary 11 (30): 35-51.

Chang, W. H. 1989. Mass Media in China: the History and the Future. Ames: Iowa State University Press.

Chey, J. V. 1979. Chinese Cultural Policy—Liberalization. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 1 (Jan): 107-112.

Donald, S. H. and M. Keane. 2002. Media in China: New Convergences, New Approaches. In Media in China: Consumption, Content and Crisis, ed. Stephanie H. Donald, Michael Keane and Yin Hong. Richmond: Curzon.

Harrison, M. 2002. Satellite and Cable Platforms: Development and Content. In Media in China: Consumption, Content and Crisis, ed. Stephanie H. Donald, Michael Keane and Yin Hong. Richmond: Curzon.

Houn, F. W. 1958-1959. Chinese Communist Control of the Press. The Public Opinion Quarterly 22 (Winter):435-448.

Hwang, K. 2004. Media and Democracy in China. World and I 19 (Sept): 1-3.

Lee, P. S. 1994. Mass Communication and National Development in China: Media Roles Reconsidered. Journal of Communication 44 (Summer): 22-37.

Jernsow, A. L. 1994. China: the Tight Leash Loosens. Columbia Journalism Review 32 (Jan-Feb): 31-33.

Lent, J. A. 1981. Freedom of Press in East Asia. Human Rights Quarterly 3 (Nov): 137-149.

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